

11 Changing Institutions: The Roles of Formal Leaders, Informal Leaders, and All Faculty

In the first chapter of this book we argued that academic higher education institutions generally do not live up to our ideals of meritocracy and inclusion, and that we fail in part because of our reliance on faulty cognitive processes in making academic judgments about entrance into the academy and promotion within it. We have also argued that if we did live up to those ideals in at least one area and achieved a more diverse faculty, we would realize benefits institutionally and for individuals. If all of that is so, then what does it take for an institution to change, or to become more inclusive and truly meritocratic in its judgments? The simplest answer is the most familiar, and it is also true: it takes leadership. But formal leaders cannot do the job by themselves. Why not?

Decisive Visionary Leadership

Let's imagine a new university president, Jack Peters, who is White and male and seems to fit the part; he "looks presidential." He also has become convinced that institutional change is crucial, and that there must be a more diverse faculty at the university. He is a passionate and persuasive speaker, and during his campus visits he laid out his vision of a fully inclusive institution and named institutional change his top priority. At the end of the usual protracted process, he was selected for the job—surely a mandate to begin enacting his vision.

Since change was his top priority, President Peters accepted the resignation of the sitting provost (routinely submitted at this institution with a new president in office) and appointed an African American man as provost. He invited him to revise both the hiring procedures of the institution and the

tenure and promotion processes, with issues of fairness, equity, inclusion, and excellence always uppermost in mind. Within a couple of months these revisions were codified in a document that President Peters presented to the governing board of the institution. They were impressed by his quick and decisive development of new policies that were consistent with what he had told them he aspired to during the search process, and they approved them with a unanimous vote. The president announced the new policies and procedures at a campus-wide event, designed to underscore the importance of these changes and their implementation during the next academic year.

To his astonishment, this speech—articulating the fulfillment of the vision he had enunciated throughout the search process—set off a firestorm of administrative and faculty objection. Deans called the provost, outraged that these misguided new procedures were being adopted without their input; chairs called deans to express their distress about how they could possibly implement the new procedures in the next year; the faculty governing body initiated an investigation into the procedure that led to the adoption of these new policies and contacted AAUP for advice; and individual faculty sent e-mails, made appointments, and talked to each other about the outrageous, top-down, totally out-of-touch administrators in charge of the institution.

What went wrong? You can, no doubt, tick off the mistakes President Peters made, and yet his style of leadership—decisive, assertive, and visionary—is the style most often held up as the model for all leaders. There is a sense in which we all hope for the kind of benevolent dictator that he tried to be. However, Americans and especially university faculty also abhor that kind of leadership; we believe in democratic participation, too. So what does that look like?

Shared Governance and Visionary Decisive Leadership

Let's imagine another new university president, Arthur Maxwell, who is also White and male and also "looks presidential." He is a deep believer in the shared governance model of the university and believes that he must implement change in concert with the faculty governance system. In his first meeting with the faculty senate, President Maxwell invites their input on how to change both hiring and tenure and promotion processes on

campus. His speech is a version of his campus visit speech, but because he is now actually discussing making changes in these processes, it is met with stiff questioning and opposition from the senators: Is he aware of the reasons behind the current practices, which have secured the outstanding faculty currently on campus? Does he plan to jeopardize the quality of the institution by imposing new standards and processes? This level of risk to the institution's standing is untenable.

President Maxwell, surprised by the vehemence of the response, agrees that he lacks the kind of deep knowledge of the institution that the sitting faculty have and says that he hopes the faculty will participate in designing the best way forward. He asks for the senate's recommendations about how he should best address the important goals of inclusion and meritocracy while at the same time keeping excellence a top priority. The senators are moved by his recognition of their role and agree to provide him with recommendations.

The senate appoints a task force to study the hiring and tenure and promotion practices of the institution and make recommendations to the president. By the end of the next semester, they send a report to the full senate indicating that there are some minor changes in language that could be adopted to signal that inclusiveness is an important value of the institution along with excellence. The senate accepts their report and sends it to the president. They invite him to respond at their next meeting, which will be at the beginning of the next academic year.

Now a full year into his term, President Maxwell attends the fall senate opening and indicates that he appreciates the report and will ask his administrative staff to work through the implications of adopting the language changes they have recommended. At the same time, he indicates that he believes more comprehensive institutional change will be needed than is envisioned in the report. He has decided, over the summer, to appoint a campus-wide committee to discuss these broader changes. Because hiring and tenure and promotion are each complex, he will ask the committee to divide into subcommittees to look into these different domains. He is also asking faculty who are scholars in organizational studies and in other social science fields to serve as consultants to the committees with respect to research that would provide guidance about the kinds of changes that are needed. He outlines his vision of a year-long process in which the entire

university is engaged in a discussion of these issues and systematically considers what changes are needed.

President Maxwell's speech is met with a mixed response. Some of the senators are pleased that he has adopted their recommendations and suspect that a faculty committee process will lead to little further change, so they are satisfied. Some of the senators feel that the president has—very politely—delivered a rebuke to them, and they are offended. Still others feel that the president has a dangerous vision that will risk the university's history and assets. And a few are excited at the prospect of a broad university discussion of these very important issues.

In the next few weeks, the committees are appointed, and some faculty begin to engage in the process outlined by the president. Other faculty express the full range of reactions hinted at in the senators' response in faculty meetings, corridor talk, and discussions with their partners at home. A small group of faculty organizes around one of the faculty senators to go to the board of governors with a concern about the danger to the institution that is posed by the president's approach. The board is very concerned about their concern and asks President Maxwell to respond.

You can imagine a variety of outcomes here: the board could support the president's vision and ignore the small group of opposing faculty; the board could ask the president to respond; the board could be persuaded that they must help the president address the faculty's concerns; there could be an eventual vote of no confidence by the faculty, the senate, or the board. In almost all possible scenarios, the process of considering these changes will be protracted and will now involve an explicit need to defend any change against the charge that it poses a risk to the core mission of the institution.

The point in considering these two scenarios is not the outcome of either, but to note that charismatic leadership and a clear vision and mandate, coupled with participatory processes, does not guarantee successful outcomes any more than the same combination of features and benevolent dictatorship does. These two examples show how male leaders might handle their role. The issues are even more complicated for leaders who are women or racial or ethnic minorities, and we will discuss those complications later.

The important point for now is that institutional change is not easy to make. But it is also not impossible. The people at the top—presidents, provosts, and deans—are critical; they must lead. However, they cannot do it alone.

Leading Change

A great deal of ink has been shed about how to “lead change” in businesses and other organizations, including those engaged in higher education (Bolman & Deal, 2003; Bolman & Gallos, 2011; Collins, 1975; Eckel, Green, Hill, & Mallon, 1999; Kotter, 1996; Rost, 1991). Much of the organizational change literature assumes that change must be “led” and led from the top. In one way that makes perfect sense: by definition, leaders have disproportionate influence in an organization. They are visible to the entire organization and to many outside it, and they are officially responsible for articulating a vision, or goals, for the next stage in the organization’s history. It makes sense that those goals might include—or even emphasize—change. In many ways, then, formal leaders of organizations are expected to play a critical role in defining desirable changes, motivating people to make those changes, and setting up a process for implementing them. So why isn’t the field of higher education filled with examples of leaders successfully arguing for transformative change?

Believing that You Need to Change

Higher educational institutions, especially in the United States, believe they have a very positive record of accomplishment, particularly when considered in an international or global context (Huffington Post, 2012; National Research Council, 2012). For many years, the U.S. higher education community was proud to be at the top of any competitive ranking, and the rate of entry of students from other countries into U.S. higher education institutions spoke for itself (Andrade, 2006; Institute of International Education, n.d.). In short, there was little competitive pressure internationally.

This pattern has shifted, and U.S. higher education is now under new competitive pressures, leading to increased efforts to deliver educational programs in settings abroad and to persuade those in other countries that the price of a U.S. diploma is not too high (*The Economist*, 2012; Lawrence, 2010; National Research Council, 2012). While there still is little pressure from U.S. students choosing to study in other countries, the world population is increasingly viewing education in the United States as a commodity that can be matched in a variety of ways, including internally. To borrow a truism from psychotherapy, higher educational institutions (like

individuals with problems) will only change if they want to—and until recently many U.S. institutions of higher education simply did not want to change. And, of course, some alumni, students, and faculty have a stake in keeping things the way they were or are.

Obstacles to Change: Competing Priorities

Even when many faculty, students, and even alumni think that an institution would be well served by making changes, there are reasons that formal institutional leaders may not articulate a “change” agenda as part of their vision. First, the top leadership is responsible to trustees and state legislatures and other governing bodies for revenue generation and responsible fiscal management (Kezar & Lester, 2011). Change can be costly and can incur unknown, hard-to-estimate costs. Since the top leadership will be held accountable first and foremost for the fiscal health of the organization, change may be lower on the list of priorities than the institution’s welfare might require. One dean who did have a strong change agenda commented on why it was so difficult to maintain it:

By my third year as dean, I understood why large public universities seemed so stodgy, so resistant to change. It wasn’t ossified bureaucracies, administrative ineptitude, or faculty sloth—as legislators and media so often charged. Rather, it was *the endless preoccupation with one budget crisis after another* that was threatening my own college’s ability to direct our attention to the goals we had set for ourselves. (Kolodny, 1998, p. 17; emphasis ours)

The power of urgent budget pressures or crises to preclude attention to needed changes should not be underestimated.

The second highest priority set for top leaders in higher education is increasing the prestige or standing of the institution, whatever its current standing (Kezar & Lester, 2011). Accomplishing improvements in prestige or relative rankings is also costly (in terms of developing equipment resources and new buildings on campus, attracting new and high-profile faculty, or altering the mix of curricula and degrees available to attract students). It certainly can be—often is—the primary “change” agenda that an institutional leader takes on (e.g., pursuing a certain ranking or pursuing inclusion in a more prestigious grouping of institutions).

These two missions—revenue generation and prestige increase—are nearly universal demands on the top leaders in higher education (see study of presidents by *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 2013). Seriously addressing

them may well crowd out other kinds of changes—changes to make the environment more “ideal” in terms, for example, of diversity and inclusion, the institutional climate, or policies that support faculty growth and development.

For this reason, leaders eager to initiate major changes on campus are most likely to be successful if they tie any change mission to one of the long-standing “core” missions of the university (including, but not limited to, the two mentioned here; others might be serving the citizens of a particular state or city, maintaining the tradition of excellence, etc.). For example, in the 1980s, James Duderstadt at the University of Michigan outlined both *The Michigan Mandate*, in 1988, and the *Women’s Agenda* in 1993), two transformational projects aiming at diversifying the campus, but explicitly tied them to maintaining excellence and Michigan’s “competitive edge” (Maher & Tetreault, 2011). Formal leaders who can explain why equity and inclusion are important to the pursuit of the core mission of the institution are more likely to be successful in improving their institutions.

Resistance to Imposed Change

At the same time, as we saw in President Peters, change in academic institutions cannot simply be imposed top-down. Academic culture is characterized by deep faculty skepticism about all administrative programs, including suspicion about their true underlying purposes (Kezar & Lester, 2011, p. 132; Kolodny, 1998, pp. 6–7). Gaining faculty trust and commitment to any given program is a project requiring considerable faculty input at the beginning and a long-term process of listening, adjusting, and continuing pressure to focus on the goal. Administrators at all levels (such as chairs and deans) need not openly resist institutional change efforts but can prevent them by “stalling.” Because they are experienced and knowledgeable about how the institution works, they can use delay to outlast the effort (Kezar & Lester, p. 160).

Faculty members can also resist by using tactics of hostility, derogation, and irony that make change efforts appear (usually to their colleagues, but sometimes to other important constituencies like alumni, legislators, and students) ill thought out, risky, and ill-advised (Kezar & Lester, 2011, pp. 162ff). Sociologist Myra Ferree (2005) has labeled these kinds of tactics “soft repression,” and she includes the use of ridicule—the kind of verbal weapon faculty are particularly well suited to use—as a primary tool for

resisting social change. As Ferree notes, ridicule can be the beginning of a war of attrition in which stigmatization of change agents and, eventually, their silencing are the later stages.

It is important also to note that there is considerable evidence that managers (in universities these are most often deans and department chairs) are most likely to respond positively to change efforts when they are positively engaged in the change through efforts at transparency and accountability, and not through “discretion control” (Dobbin, Schrage, & Kalev, 2015). Managers, like faculty, prefer to operate with some independence in choosing how to implement changes, and resent attempts to control their authority. Like everyone, they are more likely to respond to information (transparency) and reward (promised as a result of monitoring processes and outcomes—or accountability).

This problem can be overstated. It is sometimes argued that nothing that is “mandated” or required can “work” (Dobbin & Kalev, 2017, is sometimes interpreted as suggesting this). We propose instead that mandatory exposure to information and advice about good procedures can serve *transparency* (and therefore be accepted), as long as there is no explicit attempt to limit individuals’ right (even obligation) to exercise judgment. It is the impression of “thought control” or (more important) decision control that must be avoided.

For a campus change effort to survive, it needs to prevent or address both administrative stalling and faculty ridicule. Academic institutions are not characterized by a single hierarchy with a “boss” or leader at the top (Clark, 1983; Kezar, Carducci, & Contreras-McGavin, 2006). Although they do have a president or chancellor, virtually all institutions of higher education feature a “shared governance” model in which there is both a management or administrative hierarchy and a parallel and quite distinct faculty governance structure with separate powers (to set the curriculum, approve classes, award degrees, make recommendations about tenure and promotion, etc.). Those special features of higher education institutions offer resources for survival (as well as resistance!). The dual authority structure operates according to two separate bases of authority: position for the administrators and expertise for faculty. Because of the dual structure, with different power bases, efforts to make change, as well as attempts to resist it, can arise in multiple locations and employ different tactics, as we saw in the case of President Maxwell.

Convergent Bottom-Up and Top-Down Change

One analysis of the different roles of the different kinds of actors in institutions found that favorable changes in practices like hiring and retention and promotion procedures are most likely to last if efforts are simultaneously top-down (enacted by formal leaders) and bottom-up (supported by faculty experts; Kezar & Lester, 2011). When formal leaders successfully enlist the support and engagement of faculty efforts in a change process, this tends to have good results (Kezar, 2009; Lester, 2009). In contrast, only about one third of the efforts initiated by grassroots or faculty experts end up converging successfully with those of formal leaders (Kezar & Lester, pp. 228–229). It makes sense that it will be difficult to enlist administrators to join in bottom-up change, but without “buy-in” by formal leaders there is unlikely to be lasting change in institutional structures, practices, and policies.

Some Change Can Be Local

Change efforts do not always take place institution-wide. Faculty are generally most preoccupied with the climate and practices within their home department, school, or college. Sometimes the practices are the result of campus-wide policies, but often they are local practices that are open to alteration. A great deal of local-level change can be successfully launched at the departmental level by faculty in alliance with formal department leadership (the chair or head, along with any other faculty who may occupy formal leadership roles in the department). In a study of “grassroots” efforts by faculty and staff, it is noted that “once grassroots leaders were interested in diffusing their effort across the campus, it became clear that they needed to engage campus leadership and gain buy-in” (Kezar & Lester, p.228). Thus, it is the aspiration to move beyond the local that leads grassroots academic leaders to seek convergence with formal holders of administrative positions. A great deal can be done to improve local conditions before that aspiration is formed.

The Importance of Change to the Faculty

Even though it is difficult to accomplish change, many faculty pay close attention to the winds of change—or their absence—in the institution. Some faculty make judgments about the direction that the institution is going in and its ability to embrace changes that seem critical. Those judgments in

turn may either drive them into the job market and to investing in their scholarship and professional societies rather than campus institutions, or keep them focused at the home institution. As we discussed in earlier chapters, all faculty are affected by the culture at the level of the department, by a sense that the environment is supportive and inclusive (or not), and that it is possible to have an effective voice in what happens (Settles, Cortina, Malley, & Stewart, 2006; Settles, Cortina, Stewart, & Malley, 2007). Those perceptions shape how faculty feel about staying or leaving. Of course, faculty will draw conclusions not only about the degree to which changes on campus are accepted and implemented, but also about whether the process of decision-making, and the resulting outcomes, are fair.

The Importance of Data: Documenting

Where You Are and What Changes

Finally, change may take place—or fail to take place—without even being noticed if no efforts are made to track and monitor data. For example, we know of one department that regularly admitted women to study in their doctoral program; the faculty and chair therefore believed that it was making great strides in accomplishing diversity among the doctoral students. When data were provided showing the rate of PhD *completion* by gender, the department was shocked to discover that not a single female PhD student had completed the degree in over ten years. While women were being admitted in reasonable numbers, they were leaving in equal numbers. No one noticed the pattern because faculty members only knew about the one or two students they worked with in each cohort. The department did not even know it had a problem until the data were compiled and examined in a way that allowed it to see the problem. As we have stressed throughout, all efforts to make institutional change must be accompanied by a process of gathering and reporting data that enables everyone to see what is—and is not—happening.

The Role of Formal Leaders in Creating the Ideal University

As we noted above, formal leaders have disproportionate influence in organizations. Leaders are highly visible and can explain why certain goals (e.g., equity and inclusion) are important and how those goals are tied to other priorities, including the institution's core mission. Leaders also can generate

changes in practices, norms, or structures by creating or formalizing procedures. In some cases leaders control critical institutional processes (e.g., the “standard practice guide” or access to the governing board of regents or trustees or to donors). In other cases, leaders can take a practice that has been voluntary (e.g., participation in a peer education program offered by faculty on how to recruit and hire fairly) and make it a precondition for service on a search committee. If a chair, dean, or provost creates that requirement, the peer education program is legitimated and will reach a wider audience. Finally, and not trivially, formal leaders control the resources that are always needed to implement any institutional change.

Formal leaders can also create incentives and rewards to motivate other actors (other formal leaders or individual faculty members) to participate. For example, leaders can establish awards for individuals’ engaging in actions they want to encourage (e.g., for undergraduate teaching or mentoring of junior faculty) or for departments to engage in projects that might serve a larger purpose (e.g., improving the departmental climate for women and underrepresented minorities). Leaders can also provide financial support for the creation of positions, staff, and offices or funding of activities (like internal training of faculty by faculty).

The power that formal leaders have is real, even though they often minimize it, stressing the real and imagined constraints on their authority. If we are to attain ideal universities, formal leaders must be able and willing to use the power they do have toward creating and institutionalizing critical changes. Although we earlier discussed the limits on leaders—top-down fiats are rarely successful, and creating partnerships with faculty requires skill—we emphasize that leadership in academia for any purpose involves the development of such partnerships. In our experience, broad institutional change is virtually unimaginable without at least intermittent attention of the top leadership and their articulation of that change as necessary, desirable, and consistent with core values of the institution.

Types of Leaders

Formal leaders are expected to do a great deal in their roles, and some are more effective than others. One study of women college presidents identified nine “tenets of effective leadership,” including passion, reflectiveness, competence, communication ability, understanding of the role of culture, physical and emotional stamina, energy and resilience, focus combined with

forward thinking, respect and valuing of individuality and credibility (Wolverton, Bower, & Hyle, 2009, p. 150). An academic leader could reasonably feel that this is a tall order.

Among the many typologies of leadership,¹ we will focus on “transformational leaders” in contrast to transactional and laissez-faire leaders (Bensimon, Neumann, & Birnbaum, 1989; Burns, 1978; Kezar et al., 2006; Kouzes & Posner, 2002). One particularly important and influential account identifies specific characteristics of those three kinds of leaders (Eagly & Carli, 2007).

Transformational leaders have qualities that motivate respect; inspire others to productive action; communicate the values, purposes, and importance of the mission; are optimistic; explain new perspectives clearly; and mentor and develop followers. It is, of course, this last quality—mentoring and developing followers—that President Peters did not have. President Maxwell had many of the same strengths, but he too failed to create a process that would be successful at developing followers. He also had some features of a transactional leader.

Transactional leaders provide rewards for performance, attend to mistakes and failures, and wait to address problems until they are serious. President Maxwell did respond to feedback and tried to address problems proactively, but his combination of transformational and transactional qualities was not enough. Finally, *laissez-faire* leaders are often absent and uninvolved in the organization’s day-to-day operation; they are the least effective. The most effective style for academia appears to be a combination of transformational and transactional leadership (Bensimon, 1993; Kezar et al., 2006).

Combining transformational and transactional styles may be effective, but leaders (like President Maxwell) may not be equally good at all aspects of these two approaches. No one is good at everything. Effective leaders know their strengths and weaknesses and can recruit others to help them accomplish those aspects of the job that may be the most difficult for them (Bolman & Gallos, 2011). Sharing responsibility for change is useful in another way: goals will remain in focus even when the formal leadership is distracted by crises or other pressures. Sharing responsibility well requires that leaders learn about faculty expertise, experience, and concerns. Leaders may have relatively good access and knowledge about some areas and virtually none about others. Finding ways to acquire knowledge—formally or informally—is

critical to adequate framing of the goal, as well as to devising successful implementation plans. Neither of our fictitious presidents knew enough about the institution, a common occurrence. And neither recruited allies who could collaborate in changing the institution. Involving faculty in any initiative not only brings new information into the process (or can, depending on who is invited), but it can also prevent backlash or resistance that would otherwise arise if the initiatives are, or feel, imposed in a top-down manner.

Not only do formal leaders have individual leadership styles, but there are particular challenges associated with being a leader with a particular social identity. In U.S. culture, and in our examples, the concept of a “leader” is ordinarily imagined in a White male body (Rosette, Leonardelli, & Phillips, 2008). As a result, people who are “other” in some way face particular challenges in enacting the role of leader.

White Women and Underrepresented Minorities as Formal Leaders

There are two reasons that White women and underrepresented minorities face unique challenges as leaders. First, as noted above, we have preexisting ideas about leaders. According to those ideas, leaders are competent, decisive, forceful, and assertive. Second, we have gender and racial and ethnic schemas about the qualities that members of various groups have. Both White women and racial and ethnic minorities are stereotyped as not having one or more of the qualities that we expect in leaders. This lack of fit or schema incongruity between the leader schema and the schema of the group creates a demand on individuals to demonstrate that they “measure up” to the leader schema. White male leaders do not face that demand (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Glick, Wilk, & Perreault, 1995; Heilman, 1983, 2001).

In addition, White women and underrepresented minorities who demonstrate qualities that are not thought to characterize their group as a whole often face backlash—or hostile reactions to the violation of a group stereotype (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, & Phelan, 2012). Because White women and members of particular racial-ethnic minorities face different expectations, we will discuss the issues separately, including the issues facing women who are also racial or ethnic minorities versus men who are racial or ethnic minorities. Identities that involve different intersections of race and gender lead to different pressures and different reactions.

Women Leaders

Our shared cultural ideal of women includes some positive qualities that are valued in leaders, such as caring about others and being skilled at interpersonal relationships. At the same time, women are stereotyped as being relatively passive and not particularly competent—major disadvantages in a leader (see, e.g., Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman et al., 2012). There is, then, pressure on women who seek leadership roles to demonstrate that they are competent and capable of strong, decisive action (often referred to as being "agentic"). However, as discussed in chapter 3, when women do demonstrate a high degree of competence or agency, they are often "punished" by being viewed as not very likable (Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004). Rudman and her colleagues have labeled this a "backlash" effect or "Catch 22" and have demonstrated that in hiring situations women are either presumed to be less competent than comparable men (though as likable) or—if viewed as equally agentic—then as less likable (Phelan & Rudman, 2010; Rudman et al., 2012). Both processes lead to the same negative outcome: equivalently qualified women are less often viewed as attractive candidates for hiring than men. Either they are assumed not to be competent and assertive enough, or, if they are demonstrably competent and assertive, they are seen as unlikable—a classic double bind in which women are "damned if they do and damned if they don't."

Many women in leadership roles are quite conscious of these cross-pressures. For example, Mildred Garcia, while president of Berkeley College in New York, pointed out, "It's so much harder for women. We are always under a microscope. If you are strong, you are seen as bitchy. Men, in contrast, are seen as assertive; they know what they're doing" (quoted in Wolverton et al., 2009, p. 48). At the same time, it is clear that agency, or strong, decisive action, is required of leaders. So what happens when women in leadership roles act like leaders?

Women Leaders and Subordinates' Efforts to Undermine Them

Laurie Rudman and her colleagues (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012, study 5) designed an experiment that compared participants' views of male and female leaders who were described as scoring high on agentic traits (like "I believe I am a strong, confident leader") or as scoring relatively low on those traits. The men who were described as low in agency

were still rated high on competence, but only women high in agency were rated high in competence. At least they were viewed as competent if they explicitly described themselves that way!

In order to assess how subordinates responded to having a competent female leader, the experimenters created an opportunity for participants to undermine the leader's success at a task by providing unhelpful clues rather than helpful ones. As expected, the agentic female leaders were sabotaged—that is, their performance was undermined—more often than agentic male leaders were, and more often than low-agency male or female leaders. This experiment demonstrates the double-bind women leaders face: avoid sabotage by understating your competence and risk having people see you as not qualified to be a leader, or demonstrate your competence and risk provoking negative reactions that may be expressed in sabotage of your success.

Atypical Men

Although men are generally given the benefit of the doubt with respect to their fitness to be leaders, men who are not described in racial or ethnic terms and therefore probably presumed to be White suffer when they are viewed as “atypical men” (Heilman & Wallen, 2010). For example, in one study, modest men were rated as less likable, less agentic, and weaker than comparably modest women (Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Rudman, 2010). In another study, men who requested a family leave (i.e., men who violated the “ideal worker” stereotype which demands that workers have no interfering commitments outside of work) were viewed as weaker and lower on agency than comparison men; moreover, they were rated as poorer workers and were rated as less deserving of economic rewards (Rudman & Mescher, 2013).

No Room for Mistakes

College president Mildred Garcia noted that there is no room for women to make mistakes in leadership roles. She said,

Your first shot out is what they will remember. It's the only shot you have. One mistake and they'll never ask again. The majority of men can do something terrible at an institution, and a month later or six months later, they'll have another presidency. (quoted in Wolverson et al., 2009, p. 47)

Experimental evidence suggests that *both* men and women in high-status jobs that are gender incongruent are given no room to make mistakes.

Women in high-status roles stereotypically associated with men (police chiefs), and men in high-status roles stereotypically associated with women (president of a women's college), were both viewed as less competent than their gender-congruent counterparts (male police chiefs and female presidents of women's colleges) when they made a mistake (Brescoll, Dawson, & Uhlmann, 2010). As these authors note, violating gender stereotypes in high-status positions creates a situation of high risk or "fragile status" for both men and women.

Underrepresented Minorities in Leadership Roles

There is less research on underrepresented minorities in leadership roles than there is on women, but generally speaking two principles appear to characterize the research to date. First, leaders are stereotypically viewed as White (Rosette et al., 2008). In one study, both African American and Hispanic American managers were viewed as having fewer of the characteristics of a "successful manager" than Caucasian managers (Chung-Herrera & Lankau, 2005). Moreover, underrepresented minorities are—like women—stereotyped generally as less competent than Whites and therefore are seen as less suited for leadership roles (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Pratto & Pitpitan, 2008).

Second, when underrepresented minorities are presented as highly competent, they elicit negative reactions much like those that White women elicit (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1981; Livingston & Pearce, 2009). In short, underrepresented minorities (and most of the research has focused on African Americans, with a little on Latinos or Native Americans) face the same kind of double bind that has been described for women: they must overcome the presumption that they are not competent, but if they do, they are likely to face backlash unless they have also cultivated "likability."

Asians and Asian Americans in Leadership Roles

Asian and Asian American individuals are often described as subject to positive stereotypes captured by the notion of the "model minority." However, the schema for Asians disadvantages them in the areas of some key leadership traits—agency, assertiveness, and social skills—while advantaging them in the areas of academic achievement and overall competence (Chung-Herrera & Lankau, 2005; Lai & Babcock, 2012). Moreover, there is evidence

that Asians and Asian Americans are underrepresented in leadership roles even in fields where they are well represented (Mervis, 2005). To examine why this might be so, one experiment used the standard procedure of manipulating Asian-sounding versus European-sounding names and compared perceptions of individuals with otherwise-identical characteristics (Sy and his colleagues, 2010). Leaders with apparently Asian backgrounds were generally viewed as having less leadership potential than leaders with European backgrounds, though this was less true when they were described as being in occupations stereotyped as congruent for Asians (those requiring technical competence).

The Intersections of Race or Ethnicity and Gender

Most studies have examined race without reference to gender, or gender without reference to race. However, there are some important studies that suggest that the two dimensions combine to create unique stereotypes that affect how male and female ethnic minority leaders may be viewed. For example, as we noted in chapter 3, in one study Black female leaders (like White males) were able to “get away” with being agentic (i.e., their agency did not provoke backlash) in contrast to the treatment of White female and Black male leaders (Livingston, Rosette, & Washington, 2012). These results fit the experience of Sullivan County Community College president Mamie Howard-Golladay, who said, “Stereotypes can, however, work in your favor. Because people sometimes expect Black women to be aggressive, we can get away with being the kind of leaders we need to be” (quoted in Wolverton et al., 2009, p. 75).

Similarly, but demonstrating the intersection of race and gender for men, having a “baby face” has a different impact for White and Black male leaders (Livingston & Pearce, 2009). Although having a baby face was a liability for White men, it was an asset for Black male leaders, presumably because it reduced the schema-based perception of Black men as “threatening” and increased ratings of their “warmth” and “likability.”

In sum, race and gender (and no doubt other qualities) combine to create specific schemas and, therefore, specific risks and advantages for individuals in leadership positions. This is important for leaders to know, but it is also important for evaluators of leaders to know. People who are not precisely in official or formal leadership roles but are informal leaders or experts are also

subject to stereotypes. Individual leaders face different pressures and constraints as they work to decrease the gap between where our institutions are and where our ideals suggest they should be.

The Role of Informal Leaders in Creating the Ideal University

Faculty leaders who do not hold official administrative positions have been recognized as “organizational catalysts” (Sturm, 2007), “grassroots leaders” (Kezar & Lester, 2011), and “tempered radicals” (Meyerson, 2003; Meyerson & Scully, 1995). In all three cases, the faculty are respected on campus and have a strong—even passionate—commitment to making a positive change. These individuals can play a critical role in initiating change and stimulating others—including formal leaders—to take on the issue they care about and institutionalize it. However, people who become informal leaders are often divided in their commitments. They “identify with and are committed to their organizations, and are also committed to a cause, community, or ideology that is fundamentally different from, or possibly at odds with, the dominant culture of their organization” (Meyerson & Scully, 1995, p. 586). This position, combining loyalty and critique, can be uncomfortable for the individual, but it is also a position from which a change effort can be launched.

What Makes Informal Leaders Effective

Some scholars have identified characteristics of successful informal change agents. One stresses that in order to be successful, and avoid isolation, tempered radicals need allies (Meyerson, 2003). Another argues that informal change agents must be “people with knowledge, influence and credibility” (Sturm, 2007, p. 418). Faculty with those characteristics can mobilize knowledge that promotes change (Sturm, 2006). Thus, individuals who have read and understood the scholarly literature about how to achieve fairness, equity, and inclusion can speak knowledgeably to their peers about how to maximize those goals in the recruitment and evaluation of faculty and students. In turn, because informal leaders are influential and credible, formal administrative leaders may seek their input into systematic ways to mitigate bias in hiring and evaluation processes. This process is a critical step, involving “collaborations in strategic locations” (Sturm, 2006, p. 295).

Individuals can move beyond operating as persuasive experts and can foster institutional change when they are able to collaborate with formal leaders with access to formal institutional processes. Finally, organizational catalysts can pressure leaders who are not particularly interested in collaboration (Sturm, 2006, p. 276ff) by increasing campus awareness of important issues and building grassroots faculty support for making changes.

Successful “Bottom-Up” Change Efforts

One empirical study documents the successes and failures of 165 “grassroots campus leaders” drawn from the faculty and staff on five different types of higher education institutions (a liberal arts college, a community college, a research university, a technical college, and a public regional college; Kezar & Lester, 2011). On all of the campuses, the study identified “individuals who do not have positions of authority, are operating from the bottom up, and are interested in and pursue organizational changes that often challenge the status quo of the institution” (p. 8). One case study is that of Janine, a biology faculty member who is concerned about the fact that many students struggle in her courses because of math deficiencies. She makes informal efforts to address the students’ needs but quickly realizes that the demand for math support is greater than she can meet on her own. She organizes a group of faculty who also recognize the issue, and they gather data on the positive impact of math support efforts. Within a few years, the group persuades faculty elected leaders and administrators that they have a solution to a real problem; a math support center is created and becomes a campus resource. The study found as follows:

Many faculty and staff talk about Janine’s work with pride—she identified a real need and developed a change that made students more successful. While this problem had existed for years on campus, it had never been addressed and maybe never would have been without Janine’s efforts. (p. 3)

There are many other kinds of examples of institutional change efforts that began from the “bottom up” on these five campuses. Some of them attracted significant resistance or opposition, but Kezar and Lester (2011) identified successful tactics for overcoming them: flying under the radar until there was evidence to support the change, creating internal and external networks, developing coalitions, obtaining allies in positions of power, recognizing and naming power dynamics, making modest changes in their

proposals, and reframing issues (see p. 165). They point out that formal leaders were almost always critical to the success of the efforts that began with informal leaders:

Almost every successful faculty leader mentioned a supportive department chair or faculty member who had worked with him or her to understand that faculty member's scholarly interests and leadership potential and shaped his or her leadership vision.... Grassroots leaders noted these were more than mentors.... Department chairs and other supporters can use a host of practices to help faculty in playing a leadership role, such as legitimizing activities through public acknowledgment, providing resources (course releases or credit for service), and acting as institutional advocates. (p. 271)

The Value of Convergence

When the somewhat frustrated and alienated faculty members initiate a change, they usually believe that formal leaders will not welcome it, but successful changes are likely to find formal leadership support, especially if the financial cost is balanced by gains. Changes met with institutional support create alliances that tend to strengthen the loyalty and commitment of the informal leaders. Those alliances in turn bring along the legitimating authority and the access to incentives that formal leaders possess. Informal leaders may rightly suspect that formal leaders are unlikely to initiate the kinds of institutional changes that make our institutions more "ideal" (Kezar & Lester, p. 233), but informal faculty leaders can be the catalysts for those changes and bring formal leaders along.

A Word about Institutionalizing Change Efforts

Many administrators respond to pressure from alienated or marginalized faculty by creating a position in the president or provost's office exclusively focused on diversity efforts (sometimes a "diversity provost" or "diversity vice president"). Equally, they may appoint a Diversity Council or committee to take up issues of diversity on campus. While both of these gestures can be well-intentioned and necessary, we recommend that they always be carried out with a vision of "convergence" in mind. We have already noted that it is critical that the president or provost remain attentive to, and vocal about, necessary change and the underlying values it reflects. That expressed commitment cannot stop because someone has been delegated major responsibility for the issue.

For change to continue, diversity and inclusion efforts must always be integrated into the mainstream activities of the institution. Therefore, neither a diversity and inclusion “officer” nor a diversity and inclusion committee should be composed exclusively of “advocates,” nor should it be tasked to engage in activities unrelated to mainstream institutional practices. Thus, the individual’s portfolio should be broader than diversity and inclusion and should focus on some domain of essential practices of the institution (e.g., admissions, faculty recruitment, etc.).

Similarly, the committee or council should include individuals holding formal power roles, as well as diversity advocates, and the committee’s activities should include design of ongoing institutional practices, as well as implementation and accountability. Otherwise the risk is that diversity issues are ghettoized, and those most passionate and most marginalized will remain outside the “system,” without the power to make real and lasting institutional changes.

The Role of Faculty Members

Many faculty are neither formal nor informal “leaders” with respect to any given change effort. Yet they play a crucial role in either enhancing or limiting the success of those efforts by others. In short, everyone does play a role whether it is recognized—even by individuals themselves—or not.

Resisting Change Efforts of Others

Complete passivity or indifference to a change effort is a form of resistance; not responding at all to calls to recognize a problem is one way to help ensure that the problem is not addressed. Some faculty are extremely skilled at derogating change efforts, using verbal ridicule to undermine any interest in making a change. Many grassroots activists have described experiences of having their efforts discounted by colleagues. They noted that “the constant barrage of microaggressions...led to them coming in and out of leadership roles, retreating for a year or two to restore their energy” (Kezar & Lester, p. 150). So faculty can create significant “drag” on the change momentum both passively and actively—or they can avoid doing that.

Silent Agreement Can Prevent Change

Explicit agreement that something is an issue supports those who want to work on that issue. If faculty sit in tacit agreement with points made, not wanting to prolong a meeting by explicitly stating their support for a point of view, that can lead to an impression that a viewpoint is much less widely shared than it is. We know of a department that was considering making a significant change in its governance procedures in the interest of greater efficiency. Although many faculty felt there was a need to decrease the time demands of the current governance system, many meetings seemed to result in a lack of consensus about moving forward with a new plan. Finally, the department hired someone from outside to interview all faculty members about their views and to tabulate and report back about them. The astonishing result was that all but one faculty member strongly supported the change. Why was it so difficult for them to know that? First, many people said nothing in meetings, simply listening to what was being said; this made it difficult to gauge how strong the support was on either side. Second, everyone was so concerned to be sure that no “minority view” was ignored that everyone paid strict attention to the objections that were expressed. With the consultant’s report in hand, the governance structure was rapidly and permanently changed.

Supporting Change Efforts on the Ground

Faculty who are not interested in committing significant time or energy to change efforts can nevertheless serve as crucial allies in the context of everyday faculty life if their positions are secure enough for them to feel they can speak. (We recognize that those on temporary contracts may feel they cannot speak up in some contexts, and we respect their need to make sensible decisions about what they can and cannot do.) For example, nearly all faculty can talk with their passionately committed colleagues about their ideas and help them think through strategies that may make them more likely to be successful. Some may be able to provide helpful data or examples that support the arguments favoring change, provide objections that need to be countered, or clarify the limits the proposed change may have. Faculty allies can also encourage other faculty, who have reasoned reservations about the change, to articulate their reservations clearly. That will help those messages be heard by those seeking change, who can then actually address them in their proposals for a new approach.

When there are public discussions of an issue that might deserve attention, individual faculty can help create and maintain space for people to fully articulate their points of view. For example, one of us witnessed a colleague simply say, “I’d like to hear what Professor X has to say; please let him finish,” when someone was interrupted by a colleague who was ridiculing his perspective. This entirely civil request not only resulted in Professor X’s making his point, but led to a lively and constructive conversation. Sometimes it is necessary to directly challenge the assertion of a colleague who seems determined to “shoot down” an idea, or it is helpful to reframe an issue in a way that defuses the hostility of another faculty member. Those actions are important contributions to supporting change efforts being led by others.

In short, all faculty members are either supporting efforts to achieve an “ideal university” or are standing in their way. No one is irrelevant.

Where to Start?

Sometimes institutional change efforts are stalled by uncertainty about the “ideal” starting point for making the change. Should we focus on faculty recruitment? Retention? Climate? The tenure process? Sometimes it is clear that one or another beginning point is unlikely to be helpful. For example, many institutions slowed down or stopped faculty recruitment during the economic recession following 2008. That was not a good time to focus on creating change through recruitment of new faculty.

But the good news is it really doesn’t matter! Because academic institutions are large interconnected systems of systems, changing any one (major or significant) process is likely to have implications for others. Thus, for example, in many institutions that focused on creating fairer recruitment processes, faculty quickly figured out that it must also be important to think about evaluations of faculty not just during the hiring process, but also during the promotion or tenure process. Equally, recruitment of faculty from groups that are not well represented on the faculty raises questions about how those new faculty will perceive the climate. So improving the recruitment processes, the review processes, and the climate will all be necessary, but changing any of them can be the first step. We have summarized our advice about these matters both in recommendations for different members of the community at the end of this chapter and in a road map for institutional equity as a whole in box 11.1.

Box 11.1**A Road Map to Equity****The Upper Level Administration—Make Visible Commitments**

1. Publicly articulate how university or sector will benefit through increasing equity and diversity.
2. State commitment in person to faculty, staff, and students within one's purview.
3. Publicly and personally commit one's section of the institution to equity and diversity.
4. Publicly announce concrete goals, efforts, and successes.
5. Review tenure and promotion decisions for possible inequities by sex or race.
6. Finance the collection and dissemination of data.
7. Finance efforts to improve equity.
8. Reward people who make clear progress on equity and diversity.

Accountability of Deans to Provost

1. Hire deans who have made previous equity and diversity efforts.
2. Evaluation:
 - a. deans write annual self- and school appraisal, including efforts toward equity and diversity
 - b. provost and dean meet to discuss dean's performance
 - c. provost writes brief evaluation
 - d. dean's and school's benefits are dependent *in part* on progress toward equity and diversity goals (only possible when central administration controls some resources)

Accountability of Chairs (or Heads) to Deans

1. If head system, appointment includes review of previous equity and diversity efforts.
2. Evaluation:
 - a. chairs/heads write annual self- and department appraisal, including efforts toward equity and diversity—about 7–8 pages in length
 - b. dean and chair/head meet to discuss chair's/head's performance
 - c. dean writes 2–3 page evaluation
 - d. department's benefits and resources are dependent *in part* on progress toward equity and diversity goals
3. Annual review is performed by dean of faculty salaries by sex and ethnicity.
4. Review is performed by dean of start-up packages by sex and ethnicity.

Box 11.1 (continued)

Benchmarks—Up-to-Date Data Provide a Way to Measure Progress toward Goal of Equitable Hiring, Retention, and Promotion

1. Provide data to each department:
 - a. percentage of female and minority PhDs over last five years—nationally and within school
 - b. percentage of female and minority postdocs, if known
 - c. department's history:
 - i. number of hires per half-decade, presented separately by sex and ethnicity
 - ii. attrition by sex and ethnicity
 - iii. years in rank by sex and ethnicity
 - iv. service on important committees by sex and ethnicity
 - v. salary by year of degree and sex and ethnicity
 - vi. start-up packages by sex and ethnicity
 - vii. where known, comparisons with peer institutions
2. Publish data on university website for each major school or division.
3. Ask department to provide annual equity survey results; provide resources accordingly:
 - a. nominations for prizes and awards by sex
 - b. receipt of prizes and awards by sex
 - c. seminar and colloquium speakers by sex
 - d. efforts made to support faculty

Needed Resources for Team Responsible for Improving Equity and Diversity

1. Team of faculty and staff:
 - a. diverse faculty team to develop programs, encourage development of programs, monitor success in meeting goals
 - b. diverse faculty advisory board with internal and external members
 - c. institutional research (IR) person to provide and analyze data by department and school and to collect and provide data on availability pool for each department
 - d. executive assistant, full-time
 - e. projects manager, full-time to coordinate events, programs, and workshops
 - f. person to aid with dual-career hires

(continued)

Box 11.1 (continued)

2. Space:
 - a. office and meeting room in central location with rooms for central faculty, assistants, and IR person
3. Power:
 - a. authorization to look at any data at any time
 - b. support of provost and president
 - c. meetings with president at least two times per term
 - d. ability to turn down searches
 - e. authorization to review tenure and promotion decisions when upper level committees meet

When Will We Get There?

Often institutional leaders and faculty hope that after some relatively short and predictable period, the change will have been made. It will be behind us. This is a natural hope and wish, but it is one to resist. As one historian paraphrased in a meeting, “Eternal vigilance is the price of inclusion.”

Research and our experience have shown that changing institutions takes a long time (one estimate is that at least ten years is necessary for a large institution to be able to document impact in some areas, like climate; Stewart, 2015). Moreover, short-term changes can be easily reversed if adequate attention is not given to maintaining the new system along with the rationale for the changed practices. For that reason, one cannot promise or expect rapid change. The current practices were the result of decades of development, and their alteration will require sustained attention and commitment.

Nevertheless, the most important thing for those hoping for change to remember is that there have been many successful change efforts in academic institutions—ranging from modest local changes in departmental procedures (that substantially improved faculty members’ daily lives) to massive overall institutional changes. These successful changes have nearly always simultaneously engaged three kinds of actors in the collaborative process of identifying a needed change, developing a plan for new

procedures, and implementing the plan: formal leaders, informal leaders, and faculty members.

Changes of a significant kind—in which shared norms and everyday practices change—are really changes in culture, and it is cultural change that we are usually aiming for when we talk about institutional change. In order for it to happen, faculty and leaders must work together; as former institution presidents William Bowen and Michael McPherson (2016, p. 70) argued, “Administrators and faculty need to meet together around a bigger table, in a genuinely collaborative mode” to make true institutional changes real. When this kind of change happens, the payoff is that our ideal vision for our institutions gets realized—that we actually have a more inclusive academy. The evidence is that institutional change that increases the diversity and inclusion of higher education can happen much more broadly than it has; and if it does, it not only improves the institution for those who sought it, but is likely to “stick,” surviving into the future.

Recommendations for Institutional Change

Formal Leaders

1. Consider whether there are changes you would like to see in the institution that would make it more “ideal.” If you do not identify them and articulate them actively and early, you risk being so caught up in pursuit of the goals prescribed by others that you will be unable to pursue these important ones.
2. If you have institutional change goals, explicitly show how they will facilitate the “core mission” and strategic plan of the institution or unit you are leading.
3. Recognize the power of frequent, consistent communication about any important activity or goal.
4. Recognize and resist the tendency only to respond to crises rather than to set an agenda yourself.
5. Develop a process for gaining faculty and other constituencies’ input on any change you contemplate. Allow the process to be iterative, involving changes and adaptations in the change plan before it is implemented. Enlist all levels of leadership and faculty involvement in all stages of change making.

6. Ensure that there are adequate longitudinal data maintained in the institution to assess the impact of any change. Monitor the data and report on it to key constituencies, asking them to review it and address any issues they see reflected in the data.
7. Consider the special challenges and opportunities afforded by your particular gender and racial-ethnic identities.
8. Allocate the necessary resources to create and institutionalize the change you hope to see.

Informal Leaders

1. Recognize that informal leaders are often key initiators of institutional change.
2. Identify allies; create and exploit networks of like-minded faculty.
3. Recognize that informal leadership can be costly in stress and fatigue; rely on allies to support you when you are struggling with your own energy or morale.
4. Assume that there will be resistance to change, and avoid demonizing those who oppose your proposals. Instead, create opportunities for others to comment on your proposals for change. Revise your plans based on what you learn from those who are not initially convinced.
5. Enlist the support of formal leaders. Identify appropriate roles for them in the process (e.g., legitimizing the change goal, providing resources or incentives, advocating for change, providing access to institutional data).

All Faculty

1. Recognize that inaction is action, often delaying attention to an important problem or issue.
2. Recognize the damaging role of name-calling, derogation, or ridicule of efforts at change. Avoid engaging in it, and take action to mitigate or challenge it when you observe it.
3. Ask questions and make suggestions that help proposers of changes clarify and improve their proposals. Bring reasoned objections to their attention.
4. Offer explicit rather than tacit support to those leading change efforts.
5. Contribute to the creation and maintenance of open space for consideration of changes in group settings.
6. Provide information (examples, data) that is relevant to change efforts, in the service of improving those efforts.

Note

1. Some, for example, concentrate on the relative weighting of management versus leadership (Aguirre & Martinez, 2006, pp. 75–79).

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